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ABSTRACT
We develop a parsimonious model of innovating ﬁrms rich enough to confront ﬁrm-level evidence.
It captures the dynamic behavior of individual heterogenous ﬁrms, describes the evolution of an
industry with simultaneous entry and exit, and delivers a general equilibrium model of technological
change. While unifying the theoretical analysis of ﬁrms, industries, and the aggregate economy,
the model yields insights into empirical work on innovating ﬁrms. It accounts for the persistence
over time of ﬁrms’ R&D investment, the concentration of R&D among incumbent ﬁrms, and the
link between R&D and patenting. Furthermore, it explains why R&D as a fraction of revenues is
strongly related to ﬁrm productivity yet largely unrelated to ﬁrm size or growth.
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Endogenous growth theory has sketched the bare bones of an aggregate model of tech-
nological change.1 Firm-level studies of R&D, productivity, patenting, and ﬁrm growth
could add ﬂesh to these bones.2 S of a rt h e yh a v en o t .
Exploiting ﬁrm-level ﬁndings for this purpose raises diﬃcult questions. For instance,
studies of how R&D aﬀects productivity and patenting do not address why ﬁrms conduct
R&D on very diﬀerent scales in the ﬁrst place. What are the sources of this heterogeneity
in innovative eﬀort across ﬁrms, and why is it so persistent? Why do some ﬁrms prosper
while doing little or no R&D?3 Is the estimated relationship between R&D and productiv-
ity causal, or no more than a correlation? Does a ﬁrm’s productivity adequately measure
innovative performance given that many innovations appear in the form of new products?
Is patenting a superior indicator of performance?
What about ﬁrm growth? Empirical studies of growth, entry, exit, and the ﬁrm size
distribution should complement the literature on R&D, productivity and patenting.4 In
fact, these two lines of research have developed independently. They deserve an integrated
treatment.
We construct a model of innovating ﬁrms rich enough to match stylized facts from
ﬁrm-level studies yet simple enough to yield analytical results both for the dynamics of
individual ﬁrms and for the behavior of the economy as a whole. Underlying the model is a
Poisson process for a ﬁrm’s innovations with an arrival rate a function of its current R&D
and knowledge generated by its past R&D. This speciﬁcation of the innovation process
is consistent with the empirical relationship between patents and R&D at the ﬁrm level.
We derive the optimal R&D-investment rule that, together with the innovation function,
delivers ﬁrm growth rates independent of size, i.e., Gibrat’s law. The stochastic process
1The seminal papers are Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Romer
(1990).
2Much of this literature stems from the work of Zvi Griliches and his co-workers. See Griliches (1990,
1995).
3Cohen and Klepper (1996) have highlighted these puzzles.
4The classic reference is Ijiri and Simon (1977), but this literature on ﬁrm growth has recently been
revived by Sutton (1998) and Amaral et al. (1998) among others.
2for innovation leads to heterogeneity in the size of ﬁrms. The R&D rule, together with
size heterogeneity, captures the observed persistent diﬀerences in R&D across ﬁrms.5
The foundation of our approach is related Penrose’s (1959) theory of the growth of the
“innovating, multiproduct, ‘ﬂesh-and-blood’ organizations that businessmen call ﬁrms”
(p. 13). A ﬁrm of any size can expand into new markets, but in any period such growth
depends on the ﬁrm’s resources. While Penrose stresses managerial and entrepreneurial
services, our model emphasizes knowledge resources. In our formulation, a ﬁrm of any
size adds new products by innovating, but in any period its likelihood of success depends
on its knowledge capital accumulated through past product innovations. Although ﬁrms
grow by innovating in products new to them, the economy grows as innovations raise the
quality of a given set of products.
The Schumpeterian force of creative destruction is pervasive in our analysis. Firms’
innovative successes always come at the expense of competitors. A ﬁrm may be driven
out of business when hit by a series of destructive shocks. The model predicts that exit
is, in fact, the fate of any ﬁrm. While each ﬁrm follows a stochastic life cycle, industry
equilibrium generally involves simultaneous entry and exit, with a stable, skewed ﬁrm
size distribution. In this sense our model captures some of the richness of the framework
developed by Ericson and Pakes (1995). While their model is suitable for the analysis of
industries with a few competitors, we get much further analytically by taking each ﬁrm
to be small relative to the industry. Solving our model in general equilibrium extends the
work of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) by incorporating
the contribution of incumbent research ﬁrms to aggregate innovation.
The paper begins by summarizing the ﬁrm-level ﬁndings. The list of stylized facts
in section 2 is the target for our theoretical model, which is developed over sections 3-7.
Section 3 introduces our model of ﬁrm-level innovation, while section 4 derives implications
for the dynamics of a ﬁrm. Section 5 discusses heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ innovative capability.
5The work of Thompson (1996, 2001), Peretto (1999), and Klette and Griliches (2000) has a similar
motivation. Each attempts to bring realistic features of ﬁrms into an aggregate model of technological
change. Our approach diﬀers from these earlier contributions by building in the multiproduct nature of
ﬁrms. The resulting model is particularly tractable.
3Section 6 moves to the industry level, describing entry and deriving the size distribution
of ﬁrms. Section 7 solves the model in general equilibrium. In the light of our theory,
we return to the stylized facts that motivated our analysis in section 8 and oﬀer some
suggestions for future work.
2 Evidence on Innovating Firms
This section presents a comprehensive list of empirical regularities or stylized facts which
have emerged from a large number of studies using ﬁrm-level data. The theoretical frame-
work presented in the subsequent sections is aimed at providing a coherent interpretation
of these facts. We have listed the empirical regularities that are robust and economically
signiﬁcant. Following Cohen and Levin (1989) and Schmalensee (1989), we have ignored
ﬁndings (even when sometimes statistically signiﬁcant) if they appear fragile and not ro-
bust. The stylized facts on which we focus are largely summarized in surveys by others,
including Caves (1998), Cohen (1995), Griliches (1990, 1998, 2000) and Sutton (1997).
Appendix A contains a discussion of the stylized facts with more detailed references to
our sources.
Our ﬁrst two stylized facts summarize the relationship between ﬁrm R&D (measured
as expenditure, as a stock, or as a fraction of ﬁrm revenues) and innovations, measured in
terms of patents or productivity. A large number of studies have documented a signiﬁcant
positive relationship between productivity and R&D, but the relationship is only robust
in the cross-ﬁrm dimension.
Stylized Fact 1 Productivity and R&D across ﬁrms are positively related, while produc-
tivity growth is not strongly related to ﬁrm R&D.
The evidence has shown that R&D is highly correlated with patenting in cross sections
of ﬁrms, and ﬁrms that increase their R&D produce more patents. The empirical studies
also point to the shape of these relationships:
Stylized Fact 2 Patents vary proportionally with R&D across ﬁrms, while there are di-
minishing returns to R&D in the longitudinal dimension.
4The empirical evidence on patterns of R&D investment is presented in stylized facts
3 through 6. There is a large literature studying whether large ﬁrms are more R&D
intensive (i.e., devote a higher fraction of revenues to R&D) than small ﬁrms. At least
among R&D-reporting ﬁrms, the evidence suggests that R&D increases in proportion to
sales:
Stylized Fact 3 R&D intensity is independent of ﬁrm size.
Many ﬁrms report no formal R&D activity even in high-tech industries, and R&D
intensity varies substantially across ﬁrms within narrowly deﬁned industries:
Stylized Fact 4 The distribution of R&D intensity is highly skewed, and a considerable
fraction of ﬁrms report zero R&D.
Stylized Fact 5 Diﬀerences in R&D intensity across ﬁrms are highly persistent.
Stylized Fact 6 Firm R&D investment follows essentially a geometric random walk.
Our last set of stylized facts considers entry, exit, growth, and the size distribution of
ﬁrms:
Stylized Fact 7 The size distribution of ﬁrms is highly skewed.
Stylized Fact 8 Smaller ﬁrms have a lower probability of survival, but those that survive
tend to grow faster than larger ﬁrms. Among larger ﬁrms, growth rates are unrelated to
past growth or to ﬁrm size.
Stylized Fact 9 The variance of growth rates is higher for smaller ﬁrms.
Stylized Fact 10 Younger ﬁrms have a higher probability of exiting, but those that sur-
vive tend to grow faster than older ﬁrms. The market share of an entering cohort of ﬁrms
generally declines as it ages.
After we present our model in the next sections, we will return to these stylized facts
and interpret them in light of the theoretical framework.
53 The Model of an Innovating Firm
We begin our presentation of the theoretical model by describing the innovation process
for an individual ﬁrm. A ﬁrm operates in an economy with a continuum of distinct
markets j ∈ [0,1]. We interpret these markets as diﬀerentiated goods as in theories of
monopolistic competition. In what follows we sometimes refer to a market as a good.
Each good is produced by a single ﬁrm, generates a unit ﬂow of revenues, and yields a
proﬁt ﬂow 0 < ¯ π<1. A ﬁrm is deﬁned by the portfolio of goods that it produces. Since
goods all generate the same ﬂow of revenue and proﬁt to the producer, we need only keep
track of the number of distinct goods n =1 ,2,3,... that a ﬁrm produces. A ﬁrm with n
goods has revenues equal to n and proﬁts of ¯ πn.
To add new goods to its portfolio a ﬁrm invests in innovative eﬀort, which we term
R&D. If successful, such investment leads to a product or process innovation for a partic-
ular good. With this innovation, the ﬁrm can successfully compete against the incumbent
producer so that the innovating ﬁrm takes over production of the good. Expenditures
on R&D could yield an innovation relevant to any good with equal probability; i.e., the
product to which it applies is drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,1]. Since a ﬁrm
is inﬁnitesimal relative to the continuum of goods, we can ignore the possibility that it
improves on a good it is currently producing.
An incumbent producer loses a good from its portfolio when some other ﬁrm comes
up with an innovation applying to that good. The Poisson hazard rate per good is µ>0.
The parameter µ, which we call the intensity of creative destruction, is taken as given by
each ﬁrm and is taken as constant over time. In section 6 we will endogenize µ.
To summarize, a ﬁrm can be described in terms of the number of goods n that it
produces. A size n ﬁrm receives a ﬂow of proﬁts ¯ πn. It loses goods at a Poisson rate
µn. It acquires new goods at a Poisson rate I which depends on its R&D investment
and its innovation capability, as explained below. The simplest interpretation of these
assumptions about demand and competition is the quality ladder model of Grossman and
Helpman (1991). They also assume a unit measure of diﬀerentiated goods. Aggregate
6expenditure is the numeraire and preferences over the diﬀerentiated products are Cobb-
Douglas so that expenditure per good is unity. Innovations come in the form of quality
improvements, allowing the most recent innovator, through Bertrand competition, to
capture the market for a particular good. Innovations raise quality by a ﬁxed factor
q>1s ot h a t¯ π =1− q−1. The aggregate rate of innovation is also the rate of creative
destruction, µ. We now turn to our speciﬁcation of the innovation process, which is where
our model deviates substantially from the existing literature.
3.1 The Innovation Technology
We assume that a ﬁrm’s innovation rate depends on both its investment in R&D, denoted
by R, and its knowledge capital. The ﬁrm’s knowledge capital stands for all the skills,
techniques, and know-how that it draws upon as it attempts to innovate. We view knowl-
edge capital as a crucial element of what Penrose (1959) refers to as the internal resources
of the ﬁrm that can be devoted to expansion. In her analysis, these resources evolve as the
ﬁrm grows so that, while they constrain growth in any period, they have no implication
for an optimal size of ﬁrm. To capture the rather abstract concept of knowledge capital
in the simplest way, we assume that it is summarized by n, the ﬁrm’s past innovations
that have not yet been superseded.6
With knowledge capital measured by n, the innovation production function is
I = G(R,n). (1)
We assume G is (i) strictly increasing in R, (ii) strictly concave in R, (iii) strictly increasing
in n, and (iv) homogeneous of degree one in R and n. The second restriction captures
decreasing returns to expanding research eﬀort, allowing us to tie down the research
investment of an individual ﬁrm and limiting ﬁrm growth in any period. The third
captures the idea that a ﬁrm’s knowledge capital facilitates innovation. The last restriction
6Although a crude measure of a complex entity like knowledge capital, n does capture the idea that past
innovations provide fodder for new innovations. Scope economies in the development of related products
has been emphasized by Jovanovic (1993) in a static model of ﬁrm formation. A related interpretation is
that n reﬂects diﬀerences in the quality of ﬁrms’ laboratories. The set of currently commercially viable
innovations having come out of a lab would then be our proxy for the lab’s quality.
7neutralizes the eﬀect of ﬁrm size on the innovation process: A ﬁrm that is twice as large
will expect to innovate twice as fast by investing twice as much in R&D.7
In anticipation of working out the ﬁrm’s optimal R&D policy, it is convenient to rewrite
the innovation production function in the form of a cost function. Given the assumption
made above, the ﬁrm’s R&D costs are a homogenous function of the Poisson arrival rate
of innovations I a n di t ss t o c ko fk n o w l e d g en,
R = C(I,n)=nc(I/n), (2)
where c(x)=C(x,1). The intensive form of the cost function c(x) is increasing and
strictly convex in x. To avoid a number of uninteresting qualiﬁcations in the analysis
below we assume that c(0) = 0, c(x) is twice diﬀerentiable for x ≥ 0, and [¯ π − c(µ)]/r ≤
c￿(x) < ¯ π/(r + µ)f o rx ∈ [0,µ].
3.2 The Firm’s R&D Policy
A ﬁrm with n ≥ 1 products receives a ﬂow of proﬁts ¯ πn and faces a Poisson hazard µn
of becoming a ﬁrm of size n−1. By spending on R&D it inﬂuences the Poisson hazard I
of becoming a ﬁrm of size n + 1. We assume that a ﬁrm of size n chooses an innovation
policy I(n) [or equivalently an R&D policy R(n)=C(I(n),n)] to maximize its expected
present value V (n) ,g i v e naﬁ x e di n t e r e s tr a t er. We treat a ﬁrm in state n = 0 as having
permanently exited, so that V (0) = 0.
The ﬁrm’s Bellman equation is
rV(n)=m a x
I
{¯ πn − C(I,n)+I [V (n +1 )− V (n)] − µn[V (n) − V (n − 1)]}. (3)
It is easy to verify that the solution is
V (n)=vn
I(n)=λn,
7A similar innovation production function has been used by Hall and Hayashi (1989) and Klette
(1996). Our justiﬁcation was based on knowledge capital as an input to the innovation process. Another
justiﬁcation comes by analogy with accumulation of physical capital with costs of adjustment. See Lucas
(1967) and Uzawa (1969), who both use a formulation like (1). According to this interpretation, we have
simply imposed convex costs on the ﬁrm as it adjusts its stock of knowledge capital.
8where v and λ solve
c
￿(λ)=v,
(r + µ − λ)v =¯ π − c(λ). (4)
We refer to λ = I(n)/n as the ﬁrm’s innovation intensity. Note that the innovation
intensity is independent of ﬁrm size. In Appendix B we show that innovation intensity
satisﬁes 0 <λ≤ µ. Furthermore, innovation intensity is increasing in ¯ π, is decreasing in
r and µ, and is also decreasing in an upward shift of c￿.
The ﬁrm’s R&D policy is R(n)=C(I(n),n)=nc(λ). A ﬁrm scales up its R&D
expenditure in proportion to its knowledge capital.8 Research intensity, i.e., the fraction
of ﬁrm revenue spent on R&D [R/n = c(λ)], is independent of ﬁrm size, in line with
stylized fact 3. Hence, the total amount of R&D performed by a group of ﬁrms depends
on the overall size of the group but not on how ﬁrm size is distributed within the group.
Similarly, the expected number of innovations made by the group will also be unrelated
to the size distribution.
The value of a ﬁrm of any size can be decomposed into the value of each of its products,
v. We can further decompose the value of a single product. If the ﬁrm simply marketed the
product, without exploiting the associated knowledge capital to engage in new research,
the expected present discounted value would be v1 =¯ π/(r + µ). The actual value v
exceeds v1 by the amount v2 =[ λ¯ π/(r+µ)−c(λ)]/(r +µ−λ), which we interpret as the
value of a unit of knowledge capital. It is therefore possible to think of a ﬁrm of size n as
consisting of a production division whose value is v1n and a research division with value
v2n.
It is a property of the model that a ﬁrm of size n can be analyzed in terms of its
individual products or in terms of its marketing and research divisions. As stated, there
8Using the ﬁrm’s R&D policy, we can link our concept of the ﬁrm’s stock of knowledge n to the
measure proposed by Griliches (1979). For Griliches, the stock of knowledge was the discounted sum of
past R&D by the ﬁrm, which he denoted K. According to our theory, the expected value of our proposed
measure of the stock of knowledge conditional on past R&D expenditures is (up to a constant) equal to




t0 e−µ(t−s)Isds = a
￿ t
t0 e−µ(t−s)Rsds = aKt, where t0 i st h ed a t ew h e nt h e
ﬁrm was born, a = G(1,1/c(λ)). Note that the appropriate depreciation rate on past R&D is the rate of
creative destruction.
9are neither gains nor losses to merging or breaking up ﬁrms. Since we wish to focus on
the internal growth of ﬁrms, we will assume that there is some cost either to merging two
ﬁrms or to spinning oﬀ an individual product from an existing ﬁrm. Any such cost, even
if tiny, will eliminate all mergers and divestitures. Such a cost is quite plausible due to the
diﬃculty of making transactions involving technology. Exploring the exact nature of this
cost is beyond the scope of our paper, but we recognize that until we do we cannot address
interesting questions related to spin-oﬀs, ﬁrm disintegration, mergers, or acquisitions.
4 The Life Cycle of a Firm
We can now characterize the growth process for an individual ﬁrm, having solved for its
innovation intensity λ and taking as given the intensity of creative destruction µ. Consider
a ﬁrm of size n. At any instant of time it will remain in its current state, acquire a product
and grow to size n+1, or lose a product and shrink to size n−1. A ﬁrm of size one exits
if it loses its product; i.e., n = 0 is an absorbing state.
Let pn(t;n0) denote the probability that a ﬁrm is size n at date t given that it was
size n0 at date 0. The rate at which this probability changes over time ˙ pn(t;n0) depends
on the probabilities that the ﬁrm makes an innovation or loses one of its products. As
formally derived in Appendix C, ﬁrm evolution is described by the following system of
equations:
˙ pn(t;n0)=( n − 1)λpn−1(t;n0)+( n +1 ) µpn+1(t;n0) − n(λ + µ)pn(t;n0),n ≥ 1. (5)
The reasoning is as follows: (i) if the ﬁrm had n − 1 products, then with a hazard
I(n − 1) = (n − 1)λ it innovates and becomes a size n ﬁrm, (ii) if the ﬁrm had n +1
products it faces a hazard (n +1 ) µ of losing one and becoming a size n ﬁrm, but (iii) if
the ﬁrm already had n products it might either innovate or lose a product in which case
it moves to one of the adjoining states. The equation for state n =0i s
˙ p0(t;n0)=µp1(t;n0), (6)
which reﬂects that exit is an absorbing state.
10The solution to the set of coupled diﬀerence-diﬀerential equations (5) and (6) can be








µ(z − 1)e−(µ−λ)t − (λz − µ)
λ(z − 1)e−(µ−λ)t − (λz − µ)
n0
.
By repeated diﬀerentiation of the pgf we can recover the entire distribution pn(t;n0)f o r
each date t and conditional on any size n0 at date 0 (see Appendix C). To get some
intuition about this solution, we consider a few properties of the implied probability
distribution.
4.1 New Firms
We assume that ﬁrms begin with a single product. To track the size distribution at date
t of a ﬁrm entering at date 0 we set n0 = 1. (This analysis also applies to the subsequent
evolution of any ﬁrm that at some date reaches a size of n =1 , whether or not it just





p1(t;1) = [1− p0(t;1)][1 − γ(t)],




µ − λe−(µ−λ)t .
This last term satisﬁes γ(0) = 0, γ (t) > 0, and limt→∞ γ(t)=λ/µ.F o r t h e c a s e o f
λ = µ we can use l’Hopital’s rule to get γ(t)=µt/(1 + µt). Notice that in any case
limt→∞ p0(t;1) = 1; i.e., with the passage of time, the probability of exit approaches one.
Conditioning on survival, we get the simple geometric distribution (shifted 1 to the





11The parameter of this distribution is γ(t); hence, the distribution grows stochastically
larger over time. As time passes, and conditional on the ﬁrm surviving, there is an
increasingly high probability that the ﬁrm has become very large.
4.2 Firm Age
Let A denote the random age of the ﬁrm when it eventually exits. Having entered at a
size of 1, the ﬁrm exits before age a with a probability of p0(a;1). That is, the cumulative











Expected age is decreasing in the intensity of creative destruction, µ, holding λ ﬁxed.
Holding µ ﬁxed, the expected age of a ﬁrm increases in λ, becoming inﬁnite for λ = µ.





µ − λe−(µ−λ)a = µ[1 − γ(a)]. (8)
The last equality shows that the hazard rate is simply the product of the rate of creative
destruction and the probability of being in state n = 1 for a ﬁrm that has survived to age
a. It follows that the initial hazard rate of exit is µ. The hazard rate declines steadily
with age and approaches µ − λ for a very old ﬁrm. As a ﬁrm ages, implying that it has
survived, it tends to get bigger and is therefore less likely to exit, in line with stylized fact
10.9










9The probability that a ﬁrm of size n exits within t periods is p0(t;1) n. Hence, larger ﬁrms have a
lower hazard of exiting. As in Hopenhayn (1992), our model implies that the reason ﬁrm age matters for
exit is because it is a proxy for ﬁrm size. Conditional on size, younger ﬁrms are no more likely to exit,
according to these models. In the data, there appears to be an independent role for age in ﬁrm exit rates.
See Dunne et al. (1988).
12which increases with age, a. Consider a cohort of ﬁrms all entering at the same date.
As the cohort ages, the number of ﬁrms in the cohort diminishes. On the other hand,
the survivors are on average bigger. Let m denote the initial number of ﬁrms in the
cohort. Then the expected number of products produced by it (i.e., the total revenues it










If µ>λ , the share of the cohort in the overall market declines steadily with a, as in
stylized fact 10.
4.3 Large Firms
A ﬁrm of size n0 > 1 at date 0 will evolve as if it consists of n0 divisions of size 1. The
form of the pgf implies that the evolution of the entire ﬁrm is obtained by summing the
evolution of these independent divisions, each behaving as would a ﬁrm starting with a
single product. In this sense, our formal analysis of size 1 ﬁrms carries over to the behavior
of each division.
4.4 Firm Growth
We can derive the moments of ﬁrm growth directly from the pgf, as shown in Appendix
C. Let the random variable Nt denote the size of a ﬁrm at date t. Then its growth over
the period from date 0 to t is Gt =( Nt−N0)/N0. It turns out that our model is consistent
with Gibrat’s law; i.e., expected ﬁrm growth given initial size is
E [Gt|N0 = n0]=e
−(µ−λ)t − 1, (11)
which is independent of initial size. Taking the limit of E [Gt|N0 = n0]/t as t approaches
0, we get the common expected instantaneous rate of growth −(µ − λ). If µ>λ ,any
given ﬁrm will tend to decline relative to the economy. As we show in section 7, the
economy may grow fast enough so that ﬁrms on average experience positive growth even
13as they decline relative to the entire economy (our normalization of unit revenue comes
from choosing aggregate expenditure as the numeraire).
The variance of ﬁrm growth given initial size is








which declines in initial ﬁrm size, in line with stylized fact 9.10 The growth of a larger
ﬁrm is an average of the growth of its independent components; hence, the variance of
growth is inversely proportional to the ﬁrm’s initial size.11
In the derivations above we have included ﬁrms that exit during the period (and
whose growth is therefore −1). It is also possible to condition on survival. As shown
above, the probability that a ﬁrm of size n0 at date 0 survives to date t is 1−p0(t;n0)=
1 − p0(t;1) n0 =1− (µ/λ)n0γ(t)n0, which is clearly increasing in initial size. Expected
growth conditional on survival is
E [Gt|Nt > 0,N 0 = n0]=
e−(µ−λ)t
1 − [(µ/λ)γ(t)]n0 − 1,
which is a decreasing function of initial size. Knowing that an initially small ﬁrm has
survived suggests that it has grown relatively fast. For ﬁrms which are initially very large
the probability of survival to date t is close to 1 anyway, so Gibrat’s law will be a very
good approximation, in line with stylized fact 8.
5 Innovators and Imitators
We showed above that a ﬁrm’s research intensity, its research expenditure as a fraction of
revenue, is R(n)/n = c(λ). This result is attractive in the sense that research intensity is
pinned down at the ﬁrm level, persistent over time, and unrelated to the size of the ﬁrm.
However, measures of research intensity display considerable cross-sectional variability,
none of which is captured by the model.
10For the case of λ = µ, the variance expression reduces to 2µt/n0. For any λ ≤ µ, the limit as t
approaches 0 of Var[Gt|N0 = n0]/t is simply (λ + µ)/n0.
11It is well known since Hymer and Pashigian (1962) that the variance of ﬁrm growth does not fall as
steeply as the inverse of ﬁrm size. More recently Amaral et al. (1998) and Sutton (2001) have developed
models that more closely match the actual rate of decline.
14Accounting for heterogeneity in research intensity is challenging because we want to
avoid a result that research intensive ﬁrms become big ﬁrms. If this were the case then
size would be a good predictor of research intensity, which it is not (see stylized fact 3).
To avoid this implication we seek to unhinge the research process from the process of
revenue growth while introducing another dimension of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Empirical research in economics, sociology and management science has emphasized
the large and highly persistent diﬀerences in innovative strategies across ﬁrms12.T o
capture such diﬀerences, we relax the assumption that all ﬁrms receive the same ﬂow
of proﬁts ¯ π from marketing a good. Instead we endow each ﬁrm with a proﬁt level
0 <π<1. A ﬁrm making major innovations obtains a ﬂow of proﬁts close to one while a
less innovative ﬁrm obtains π closer to zero. A ﬁrm with π close to zero may be considered
more of an imitator than an innovator, as in Nelson (1988). In the quality ladders model,
these diﬀerences in proﬁts would reﬂect diﬀerences in the inventive steps q of diﬀerent
ﬁrms, π =1− q−1. We pursue this interpretation below.
Aﬁ r m ’ st y p eπ remains ﬁxed throughout the life of the ﬁrm. The type not only
aﬀects the ﬁrm’s ﬂow of proﬁts from an innovation but also its cost of doing research.
To obtain independence between innovative ability and ﬁrm growth, we assume that the
cost of making larger innovations rises in proportion to the greater proﬁtability of such
innovations. That is, a ﬁrm of type π has a research cost function Cπ(I,n)=π
¯ πC(I,n).
For a ﬁrm of type π =¯ π, this speciﬁcation reduces to the research cost function C(I,n)
used above.
Returning to a ﬁrm’s R&D policy, we need to modify the analysis only slightly. The
intensive form of the cost function becomes cπ(I/n)=π
¯ πc(I/n). The solution to the
Bellman’s equation (4) remains unchanged for a ﬁrm of type ¯ π. More generally, the value
per product of a ﬁrm of type π is simply vπ = π
¯ πv.I n n o v a t i o ni n t e n s i t yλ i st h es a m ef o r
ﬁrms of any type; i.e., ﬁrm growth is unrelated to inventiveness, π. On the other hand,
R&D intensity for a ﬁrm of type π is Cπ(I,n)/n = π
¯ πc(I/n)=π
¯ πc(λ). Thus, heterogeneity
12See e.g. Henderson (1993), Cohen (1995), Langlois and Robertson (1995), Klepper (1996), Carroll
and Hannan (2000), Cockburn et al. (2000) and Jovanovic (2001). Geroski et al. (1997) presents a
contradictory view (see their stylized fact 5).
15in π carries over to R&D intensity, with the more innovative ﬁrms being more research
intensive.
6 Entry and Industry Evolution
In this section we examine the dynamic process characterizing an industry with many
competing ﬁrms. In considering an industry, we assume that every product is being
produced by some ﬁrm. The number of goods produced by any given ﬁrm is countable;
hence, there must be a mass of ﬁrms to account for the unit continuum of products. We
can describe the state of the industry in terms of the measure of ﬁrms of each size. There
is no randomness at the industry level.
We denote the measure of ﬁrms in the industry with n products at date t by Mn(t).
The total measure of ﬁrms in the industry is M(t)=
∞
n=1 Mn(t). Because there is a unit
mass of products, and each product is produced by exactly one ﬁrm,
∞
n=1 nMn(t)=1 .







where λ is the innovation intensity of incumbent ﬁrms. Innovative activity is related to
ﬁrm size and yet the size distribution of ﬁrms has no implications for the total amount of
innovation carried out by incumbents.
Although each ﬁrm takes the intensity of creative destruction µ as given, this mag-
nitude is determined endogenously for the industry. One component of it is the rate of
innovation by incumbents λ. The other component is the rate of innovation by entrants
η, so that
µ = η + λ. (13)
We now turn to the determination of η.
166.1 Firm Entry
As mentioned above, we assume that entrants begin with a single product. Their type π
is drawn from a distribution Φ(π), whose mean value is ¯ π. There is a ﬁxed cost of entry
F and a mass of potential entrants. Entrants do not know their type π w h e nt h e yp a y
the entry cost, but they know the distribution of types. Under these conditions, if there
is active entry we have the condition F = E[vπ]=v.
When there is active entry, i.e., η>0, the optimal R&D policy of incumbents pins
down their innovation intensity:
c
￿(λ)=F, (14)
or else, if c￿(0) >Fthen λ = 0 . If the cost of entry is higher incumbents are shielded more
eﬀectively from competition and therefore invest more in innovation. On the other hand,
with active entry, (14) shows that the innovation intensity of incumbents is unrelated to
demand side incentives, such as the mean proﬁt ﬂow from an innovation, ¯ π. The reason
is that entry responds to these demand side incentives, exactly neutralizing any potential
inﬂuence on incumbents.
To pin down the rate of innovation by entrants, we return to the expression for the
value function from (4). Rearranging it under the assumption that there is active entry,
i.e., F = v, and using (13), we get
η =
¯ π − c(λ)
F
− r.
Of course, for this solution to be valid we require F to be small enough so that the
equation above yields η>0, in which case it follows that λ<µ .
Alternatively, for F large enough, there will be no entry. In this case we can set
µ = λ in the solution to the Bellman’s equation (4), which yields λ as the solution to
c￿(λ)=v =[ ¯ π − c(λ)]/r and η =0 .
6.2 The Size Distribution
We now have expressions for η, λ; hence, µ = η+λ. These parameters are all that matter
for analyzing the size distribution of ﬁrms. The state of the industry is summarized by
17the measure of ﬁrms with 1,2,3,... products.13
Flowing into the mass of ﬁrms with n products are ﬁrms with n−1 products that just
acquired a new product and ﬁrms with n + 1 products that just lost one. Flowing out
of the mass of ﬁrms with n products are ﬁrms that were of that size and that either just
acquired or just lost a product. Thus, for n ≥ 2,
˙ Mn(t)=( n − 1)λMn−1(t)+( n +1 ) µMn+1(t) − n(λ + µ)Mn(t). (15)
For n = 1 we have
˙ M1(t)=η +2 µM2(t) − (λ + µ)M1(t). (16)
In the case of no entry, η = 0, the mass of ﬁrms of any particular size will not settle
down. We can still study the evolution of the industry, however, using the analysis of
section 4. Suppose at date 0 the industry consists of a mass M(0) of ﬁrms, all of size 1. By
date t, there will be a mass M(t)=[ 1−p0(t;1)]M(0), among whom the size distribution
will be geometric with a parameter µt/(1+µt). Thus, without entry, the size distribution
becomes ever more skewed and the industry becomes ever more concentrated.
In the case of positive entry, η>0, we show below that the industry will converge
to a steady state with a constant mass of ﬁrms and ﬁxed size distribution. To solve for
this steady state, set all the time derivatives to zero in (15) and (16). In Appendix D, we











,n ≥ 1, (17)
where θ = η/λ. The mass of large ﬁrms is greatest as θ approaches zero, i.e., when there















13Since ﬁrms of any type π choose the same innovation intensity λ (and thus follow the same stochastic
growth process) the distribution of types Φ among entrants carries over to the distribution of types among
ﬁrms of any particular size n.
18In the steady state, the mass of ﬁrms in the industry is an increasing function of the
entry rate. The mass approaches one as the entry rate gets arbitrarily large (or λ gets
arbitrarily small). In this case almost all ﬁrms are new entrants with just one product.
As the rate of entry approaches zero (or λ gets arbitrarily large), the mass of ﬁrms in the
industry gets very small, indicating that the average ﬁrm is large, i.e., has many products.











This is the well-known logarithmic distribution, as discussed in Johnson et al. (1993). The
distribution is highly skewed, in line with stylized fact 7. The mean of the distribution,
i.e., the average number of products per ﬁrm, is θ
−1/ln(1 + θ
−1), which is decreasing in
θ. The logarithmic distribution is discussed in the context of ﬁrm sizes by Ijiri and Simon
(1977).
We can analyze industry dynamics outside of the steady state, and establish conver-
gence to the steady state, by integrating over the history of cohorts of entrants while
















All ﬁrms in existence at date 0 will eventually exit; hence,
lim
t→∞pn(t,n0)=0 , ∀[n,n0] ≥ 1.
This result suggests that the ﬁrst summation in (19) disappears as t →∞ , which is argued
more formally in Appendix D. If η>0, the second term converges to
η
nλ(λ/µ)n = Mn.
Thus, with entry, the system converges to the steady state distribution (17), and in fact
we can trace out its evolution during this process of convergence using (19).14
14Notice that λ and µ are constants even out of the steady state, as shown in section 6.1.
197 General Equilibrium and Growth
In the introduction, we asserted that studies of innovating ﬁrms could add ﬂesh to the
bones of endogenous growth theory. To evaluate that assertion, in this section we conduct
our analysis in a general equilibrium setting. The resulting model of growth diﬀers from
its predecessors in describing the dynamics, the heterogeneity, and the innovative output
of incumbent research ﬁrms. Capturing the role of incumbent research ﬁrms is not only
important for describing reality, as only a small fraction of R&D is actually performed
by entrants, but is also critical for evaluating policies that will often aﬀect incumbents
diﬀerently than entrants.
By closing the model in general equilibrium, we can also clarify our seemingly arbitrary
assumptions made above about the size of the market for a good, the constancy of the
interest rate, and the inputs entering the innovation technology. We therefore make
explicit the close link between the structure of our model and the quality ladder model
in Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapter 4).15
In the context of a quality ladders model our innovations take the form of product
improvements. The inventive step q>1 represents the factor improvement in quality so
that if quality was y, after an innovation it rises to qy. The proﬁt ﬂow from making such
an innovation is π =1− q−1. A ﬁrm of type π is thus a ﬁrm taking innovative steps of
size q =( 1− π)
−1. By chance, ﬁrms of various types will make innovations related to any
particular good j.W el e tq(j,k) denote the step size of innovation k for good j.













15Like the model in Grossman and Helpman (1991), our model suﬀers from the empirical shortcomings
pointed out by Jones (1995). In particular, it cannot account for the observed upward trend in aggregate
R&D while at the same time accounting for the lack of any observed upward trend in productivity
growth. We believe that the model could be modiﬁed to address these issues, along the lines of either
Kortum (1997), Eaton and Kortum (1999), or Howitt (2000). We have not introduced such a modiﬁcation
h e r eb e c a u s ew ed on o tt h i n kt h eﬁ r m - l e v e ld a t ah a v ea n y t h i n gt os a ya b o u tw h i c ho n e ,i fa n y ,i sm o s t
appropriate.
20where ρ is the discount rate while xτ(j) is the quantity and zτ(j) is the quality of con-
sumption good j at date τ. The quality level of good j, zτ(j), develops through a series





Following Grossman and Helpman, we choose aggregate expenditures to be the numeraire,
setting them to one in each period. This normalization delivers our assumption above that
the ﬂow of revenues per good is always one. Another implication of this normalization is
that r = ρ, delivering our assumption of a constant discount rate faced by the ﬁrms.
An innovator will engage in Bertrand competition with the incumbent he displaces.
The result of this competition is that the innovator takes over the market. Let qτ(j)=
q(j,Jτ(j)) denote the inventive step for the last innovation made prior to date τ. It follows
that the price per (physical) unit of good j is
pτ(j)=wq τ(j).








The proﬁt ﬂow from product j at time τ is πτ(j)=[ pτ(j) − w]xτ(j)=1− [qτ(j)]
−1,a s
asserted above.
We can aggregate across goods by exploiting the law of large numbers while noting
that Jτ(j) is distributed Poisson with parameter µτ (if the innovation process begins at
date 0):





21and Ψ(q) is the cumulative distribution function of the step sizes.16 T h eg r o w t hr a t eo f
t h em a r k e te c o n o m yi sdlnCτ/dτ = µE[lnq]. To complete the analysis of growth for
this market economy, we derive µ in terms of parameters of the model.
There is a ﬁxed endowment of L workers. Workers can produce output (as do LX),
create start-up ﬁrms (as do LS), or perform research within incumbent ﬁrms (as do LR).
Thus L = LX + LS + LR. We will examine an equilibrium in which all activities take
place. An implication is that the wage w for all activities is the same. The case of no
entry is a simple extension.
We derive labor demand for each of the three activities starting with production work.
Choosing units of output so that production workers have productivity one, labor demand
for producing good j is lX(j)=x(j)=[ q(j) w]










We now turn to demand for researchers at incumbent ﬁrms. We assume that all
research costs are in the form of researcher wages. Thus, the number of researchers
employed at any ﬁrm of size n is
LR(n)=R(n)/w = nc(λ)/w = nl R(λ),
which implicitly deﬁnes the number of researchers per good as lR(λ)=c(λ)/w. Aggre-









Finally, a worker trying to launch a ﬁrm gets an idea for an innovation at a Poisson
arrival rate h. Thus the cost of entry is the opportunity cost of the expected time until
16Replacing average values across the inﬁnite set of goods by the expected value, we get
￿ 1
0 lnxτ(j)dj =






dj =( µτ)E [lnqτ]. The expectations are over the distribution of q,
which is closely linked to the distribution of π introduced in section 5: Φ(π)=Ψ ( [ 1− π]
−1). As noted
earlier, since the stochastic process of survival and growth is the same across ﬁrms of any type, the
distribution of types among incumbents is the same as the distribution among entrants.
22the ﬁrst innovation, F = w/h. The value of a start-up ﬁrm (with one product) is still v.
The equilibrium condition (assuming active entry) becomes w = hv or v = w/h. Since
c￿(λ)=v it follows that l￿
R(λ)=h−1. Thus, the innovation rate of incumbents is tied
down by the productivity h of entrants. The equation for the entry rate becomes
η =
¯ π − c(λ)
w/h
− r =
(1 − E [q−1])h
w
− hlR(λ) − ρ.
Given η, we can read oﬀ the demand for start-up labor from η = hLS.
We can now solve for the wage that equates the labor endowment L and the three
sources of demand for labor, assuming a steady state with active entry. Simplifying and
rearranging, we obtain w = h
Lh+ρ. Substituting this value of the wage into our expression











The equilibrium growth rate of the market economy is µE [lnq], i.e., the rate of in-
novation by both entrants and incumbents multiplied by the expected percentage size of
inventive steps. The overall innovation rate is










where, as noted above, λ solves l 
R(λ)=h−1. The ﬁrst two terms of the expression for µ
are identical to Grossman and Helpman (1991).17
The term λ−hlR(λ) is new. It represents the contribution of incumbents to aggregate
innovation less the innovation that would have occurred if the researchers employed by
incumbent ﬁrms were instead employed in start-ups. The term is positive if the knowledge
capital accumulated by incumbent ﬁrms is a productive resource in generating new inno-
vations. In equilibrium, the innovative productivity of the last researcher at an incumbent
17As a special case of the model, the remaining two terms are zero and our model collapses to Grossman
and Helpman (1991), with all research performed by entrants. In particular, assume that knowledge
capital does not enter the innovation production function: I = G(R,n)=hRR/w,w i t hhR representing
the productivity of researchers at incumbent ﬁrms. If hR <hthen incumbents will choose λ =0( o n l y








23ﬁrm is equated to her productivity at a start-up. But the inframarginal researchers are
more productive at incumbent ﬁrms than at start-up ﬁrms.
In Appendix E we examine whether the market equilibrium is eﬃcient. In the special
case with no variation in q across ﬁrms, we replicate the welfare conclusion by Grossman
and Helpman (1991): The market economy grows too slowly when the inventive step q
is in an intermediate range. On the other hand, if q is either very small or very large
then the market economy grows too fast. However, this welfare conclusion is sensitive to
deviations from the assumed Cobb-Douglas preferences, as pointed out by Li (2001), who
examines a quality ladder model with CES preferences.
8 Discussion
Having laid out the theory, we ask, what are its implications for ﬁrm-level studies of R&D,
productivity, and patenting? What has our analysis contributed to the existing theories
of ﬁrm and industry dynamics? Where do we go from here? We conclude by addressing
these questions in turn.
8.1 Interpreting Firm-Level Indicators of Innovation
We have commented along the way when our model ﬁt one of the stylized facts listed in
section 2. Here we return to the questions that motivated our work: Why does R&D vary
so much across ﬁrms, and how do these diﬀerences in research input show up in measures
of innovative output?
8.1.1 R&D Investment
A central prediction of our model is that R&D intensity (R&D as a fraction of sales) is
independent of ﬁrm size. While a ﬁrm faces diminishing returns to expanding R&D at
a point in time, a larger ﬁrm has more knowledge capital to devote to the innovation
process. When R&D investment scales with ﬁrm size, as it does when ﬁrms choose
R&D optimally, these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other, leaving both the average and
the marginal productivity of research the same across diﬀerent sizes of ﬁrms. Since the
24model generates substantial heterogeneity in ﬁrm size, it predicts large diﬀerences in R&D
investment across ﬁrms. Since the model generates substantial persistence in ﬁrm size, it
also predicts persistence in R&D investment, in line with stylized fact 6.
A second source of diﬀerences in R&D across ﬁrms arises from heterogeneity in research
intensity (as required by stylized fact 4). We posit exogenous permanent diﬀerences across
ﬁrms in the size of the inventive steps embodied in their innovations, with research costs
increasing in the size of the step. Although larger inventive steps are more proﬁtable,
their increased cost is just enough so that all ﬁrms optimally choose to innovate at the
same rate. Nonetheless, ﬁrms that take big steps are more research intensive than more
imitative ﬁrms taking tiny steps. Since they all innovate at the same rate, the more R&D
intensive ﬁrms do not grow faster, and hence end up being no larger on average, than
the more imitative ﬁrms. This last result maintains the observed independence of ﬁrm
size and R&D intensity (stylized fact 3). Since a ﬁrm always takes inventive steps of a
particular size, we capture the persistence of diﬀerences in R&D intensity (stylized fact
5). Of course, our explanation prompts the question of why a ﬁrm is endowed with the
ability to take inventive steps of a particular size. We defer this question for future work.
8.1.2 R&D and Patenting
We can relate the ﬁrm-level innovation production function (1) to data under the assump-
tion that each innovation is patented. Our speciﬁcation of decreasing returns to R&D in
the innovation production function then appears to contradict the observation of constant
returns in ﬁrm-level regressions of patents on R&D (stylized fact 2). This contradiction
is only apparent since knowledge capital is also an input in our innovation production
function and R&D is endogenous in the model. In the case of equal sized inventive steps,
the optimal R&D policy implies that ﬁrms doing more R&D have more knowledge capital.
Looking across ﬁrms that have optimally chosen their R&D investment, the model implies
that patents should follow a Poisson distribution with a parameter proportional to ﬁrm
R&D, much like what has been observed.
Allowing for heterogeneous research intensity, but continuing to assume one patent
25per innovation, the model predicts that patents should rise less than proportionately
with R&D. The reason is that variation in R&D then reﬂects not only diﬀerences in
knowledge capital but also heterogeneity in the size of ﬁrms’ inventive steps. The expected
number of patents rises in proportion to the former but is unrelated to the latter. If,
however, innovations embodying larger inventive steps are more likely to be patented or
to receive more than one patent, the model could still match the observed constant returns
relationship.
8.1.3 R&D and Productivity
How can we relate a ﬁrm’s productivity to its innovative performance if, as in our model,
the ﬁrm innovates by extending its product line? It turns out that while patents are an
indicator of the number of innovations, higher productivity reﬂects larger inventive steps.
Since a ﬁrm’s R&D intensity is also increasing in the size of its inventive steps, we predict
the observed positive correlation between R&D intensity and productivity (stylized fact
1).
To make this argument precise, consider a ﬁrm taking inventive steps of size q. The
step size gives the ﬁrm market power which it exploits by setting the prices of its products
equal to a markup q over its constant unit labor cost. Summing across the ﬁrm’s products,
the ratio of its total revenue to its total labor cost is also equal to q. We would typically
measure the ﬁrm’s productivity a as the value of its output divided by employment. Thus
a = qw, where w is the market wage rate. Variation in the size of inventive steps across
ﬁrms produces heterogeneity in this measure of productivity. Since we assume that the
size of inventive steps is a characteristic of a ﬁrm, we predict persistent diﬀerences in
productivity.18
8.2 Interpreting Firm and Industry Dynamics
We argued in the introduction that ﬁrm innovation and ﬁrm growth deserve an integrated
treatment. It turns out that our model of innovating ﬁrms has the key elements found in
18Our argument about how to interpret measures of ﬁrm-level productivity borrows from earlier work
by Klette and Griliches (1996) and Bernard et al. (2000).
26existing models of ﬁrm and industry dynamics: heterogeneous ﬁrms, simultaneous exit and
entry, optimal investments in expansion, explicit individual ﬁrm dynamics, and a steady-
state ﬁrm size distribution. In contrast to the existing literature, including Simon and
Bonini (1958), Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson and Pakes (1995), and Sutton
(1998), our model captures all these elements while remaining analytically tractable.
The fundamental source of ﬁrm heterogeneity in the model is the luck of the draw in
R&D. A ﬁrm grows if it innovates and shrinks if a competitor innovates by improving on
one of the ﬁrm’s products. The ﬁrm’s optimal R&D strategy has it innovate at a rate
proportional to its size. A ﬁrm enters if the expected value of a new product covers the
entry cost, and it exits when it loses its last product to a competitor. Together, these
elements of the model capture (i) exit probabilities that are decreasing in ﬁrm size (and
age), (ii) ﬁrm growth rates that are decreasing in size among surviving small ﬁrms, and
(iii) Gibrat’s law holding as a good approximation for large ﬁrms. The dispersion in ﬁrm
sizes converges to a stable skewed distribution.
Of course, our model has set aside some important aspects of reality. We assume, as
in Hopenhayn (1992), a continuum of ﬁrms and no aggregate shocks. Hence, we have
ruled out aggregate uncertainty as well as strategic investment behavior, features likely to
be important in an industry with just a few competitors. The Ericson and Pakes (1995)
framework is much richer in these respects, but at the cost of substantial complexity.
8.3 Directions for Future Work
Our goal has been to establish a connection between theories of aggregate technological
change and ﬁndings from ﬁrm-level studies of innovation. The potential payoﬀ is twofold.
We have attempted to demonstrate above that our fully articulated equilibrium model
can clarify the interpretation of ﬁrm-level empirical ﬁndings. Furthermore, building on
the ﬁrm-level stylized facts, the resulting aggregate model is likely to be more credible
both as a description of reality and as a tool for policy analysis.
One direction for future research is to analyze a speciﬁc industry in which innovation
plays a major role. With ﬁrm-level panel data on R&D, patenting, employment, and
27revenue from such an industry, we could subject the model to a more detailed quantitative
assessment. If it survives such an assessment, the model could help explore diﬃcult
questions about the interactions between industry evolution and technological change.
Another direction is to pursue the model’s implications for policy. Unlike in its prede-
cessors, in our model incumbent research ﬁrms play an important role in driving aggregate
technological change. This feature is essential for evaluating the impact of actual R&D
subsidies, which, as emphasized by Mansﬁeld (1986), are often explicitly designed to act
on the marginal expenditures of R&D-doing ﬁrms. We see a potential for extending the
analysis here to address questions that frequently arise concerning policies to promote
innovation.
28Appendix A: Discussion and references for the evidence of inno-
vating ﬁrms
R&D, Productivity, and Patents
Stylized Fact 1 Productivity and R&D across ﬁrms are positively related, while produc-
tivity growth is not strongly related to ﬁrm R&D.
There is a vast literature verifying a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship
between measured productivity and R&D activity at the ﬁrm level. See, e.g., Griliches
(1998, ch.12; 2000, ch.4) and Hall (1996). This positive relationship has been consistently
veriﬁed in a number of studies focusing on cross-sectional diﬀerences across ﬁrms. The
longitudinal (within-ﬁrm, across-time) relationship between ﬁrm-level diﬀerences in R&D
and productivity growth, which controls for permanent diﬀerences across ﬁrms, has turned
out to be fragile and typically not statistically signiﬁcant.
Stylized Fact 2 Patents vary proportionally with R&D across ﬁrms, while there are di-
minishing returns to R&D in the longitudinal dimension.
The relationship between innovation, patents, and R&D has been surveyed by Griliches
(1990). He emphasizes that there is quite a strong relationship across ﬁrms between R&D
and the number of patents received. For larger ﬁrms the patents-R&D relationship is
close to linear, whereas there is a reasonably large number of smaller ﬁrms that exhibit
signiﬁcant patenting while reporting very little R&D. That is to say, small ﬁrms appear
to be more eﬃcient, receiving a larger number of patents per R&D dollar. Cohen and
Klepper (1996) emphasize this high patent-R&D ratio among the small ﬁrms and interpret
it as evidence for smaller ﬁrms being more innovative.
Griliches (1990), on the other hand, argues that “the appearance of diminishing returns
at the cross-sectional level is due, I think, primarily to two eﬀects: selectivity and the
diﬀerential role of formal R&D and patents for small and large ﬁrms” (p. 1675). There
is a selectivity bias since small ﬁrms in available samples are not representative but are
typically more innovative than the average small ﬁrm. Furthermore, “small ﬁrms are likely
29to be doing relatively more informal R&D while reporting less of it and hence providing
the appearance of more patents per R&D dollar” (p. 1676).19 Hence, Griliches suggests
that in terms of patents per R&D dollar, there is little evidence for diminishing returns
in the cross-sectional dimension.
There is also a robust patents-R&D relationship in the longitudinal dimension: “the
evidence is quite strong that when a ﬁrm changes its R&D expenditures, parallel changes
occur also in its patent numbers” [Griliches (1990), p. 1674]. A diminishing returns re-
lationship between patents and R&D is more pronounced in the longitudinal dimension
than in the cross section. Referring to Hall et al. (1986) and other studies, Griliches sug-
gests that the patent elasticity of R&D is between 0.3 and 0.6. Using recent econometric
techniques on the same sample as Hall et al., Blundell et al. (1999) report somewhat
higher estimates, in the range 0.6 to 0.9.
R&D Investment
Stylized Fact 3 R&D intensity is independent of ﬁrm size.
The large literature relating R&D expenditures to ﬁrm size is surveyed by Cohen
(1995) and Cohen and Klepper (1996). Cohen and Klepper state that among ﬁrms doing
R&D, “in most industries it has not been possible to reject the null hypothesis that R&D
varies proportionately with size across the entire ﬁrm size distribution” (p. 929). On the
other hand, they also point out, “The likelihood of a ﬁrm reporting positive R&D eﬀort
rises with ﬁrm size, and approaches one for ﬁrms in the largest size ranges” (p. 928).
While the ﬁrst statement supports stylized fact 3, the second seems to contradict it.
As pointed out above, Griliches (1990) interprets the appearance of less R&D among
small ﬁrms as an artifact of the available data rather than a reﬂection of diﬀerences in
real innovative activity between large and small ﬁrms. That is to say, the higher fraction
of small ﬁrms reporting no formal R&D is oﬀset by small ﬁrms doing more informal
R&D. Furthermore, smaller ﬁrms tend to have a lower absolute level of R&D, and R&D
surveys often have a reporting threshold related to the absolute level of R&D. Similarly,
19See Kleinknecht (1987).
30the innovative activity being singled out in a ﬁrm’s accounts as formal R&D is related to
the absolute level of R&D.
Stylized Fact 4 The distribution of R&D intensity is highly skewed, and a considerable
fraction of ﬁrms report zero R&D.
A number of studies have reported substantial variation in R&D intensities across
ﬁrms within the same industry. See Cohen (1995). Cohen and Klepper (1992) show that
the R&D intensity distribution exhibits a regular pattern across industries, in accordance
with stylized fact 4. The R&D intensity distributions they present are all unimodal,
are positively skewed with a long tail to the right, and have a large number of R&D
non-performers. Klette and Johansen (1998) report the same pattern of a unimodal and
skewed R&D intensity distribution based on a sample of Norwegian ﬁrms.
Stylized Fact 5 Diﬀerences in R&D intensity across ﬁrms are highly persistent.
Scott (1984) shows that in a large longitudinal sample of U.S. ﬁrms about 50 percent of
the variance in business unit R&D intensity is accounted for by ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Klette
and Johansen (1998), considering a panel of Norwegian ﬁrms in high-tech industries,
conﬁrm that diﬀerences in R&D intensity are highly persistent over a number of years
and that R&D investment is far more persistent than investment in physical capital.
Stylized Fact 6 Firm R&D investment follows essentially a geometric random walk.
In a study of U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms, Hall et al. (1986) concludes by describing
“R&D investment [in logs] within a ﬁrm as essentially a random walk with an error vari-
ance which is small (about 1.5 percent) relative to the total variance of R&D expenditures
between ﬁrms” (p. 281). Similarly, Klette and Griliches (2000) report zero correlation
between changes in log R&D and the level of R&D for Norwegian ﬁrms.
31Entry, Exit, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms
Stylized Fact 7 The size distribution of ﬁrms is highly skewed.
This fact has been recognized for a long time. See Ijiri and Simon (1977) and
Schmalensee (1989)20. According to Audretsch (1995), “virtually no other economic phe-
nomenon has persisted as consistently as the skewed asymmetric ﬁrm-size distribution.
Not only is it almost identical across every manufacturing industry, but it has remained
strikingly constant over time (at least since the Second World War) and even across
developed industrialized nations” (p. 65).
Stylized Fact 8 Smaller ﬁrms have a lower probability of survival, but those that survive
tend to grow faster than larger ﬁrms. Among larger ﬁrms, growth rates are unrelated to
past growth or to ﬁrm size.
Stylized fact 8 has emerged from a number of empirical studies from the last 10-15
years as a reﬁnement of Gibrat’s law, which states that ﬁrm sizes and growth rates are
uncorrelated. Our statement corresponds to the summaries of the literature on Gibrat’s
law by Sutton (1997), Caves (1998) and Geroski (1998).
Stylized Fact 9 The variance of growth rates is higher for smaller ﬁrms.
This pattern has been recognized in a large number of studies discussed in Sutton
(1997) and Caves (1998).
Stylized Fact 10 Younger ﬁrms have a higher probability of exiting, but those that sur-
vive tend to grow faster than older ﬁrms. The market share of an entering cohort of ﬁrms
generally declines as it ages.
Caves (1998) reviews the empirical literature on patterns among new entrant ﬁrms.
20A recent contribution to the empirical literature is Stanley et al. (1995).
32Appendix B: The Firm’s Innovation Policy
To derive properties of the ﬁrm’s innovation policy, it is useful to construct the function
f(x)=[ ¯ π −c(x)]/[r + µ−x]. The solution to the Bellman’s equation (3) implies f(λ)=
v = c￿(λ), where λ is the ﬁrm’s optimal innovation intensity.
Diﬀerentiating, we get f￿(x)=[ f(x) − c￿(x)]/[r + µ − x]. Our assumptions on the
cost function imply f(0) >c ￿(0) and f(µ) ≤ c￿(µ). Combining these results, f￿(0) > 0
and f￿(µ) ≤ 0. Thus, there is some intermediate x∗ ∈ (0,µ] such that f (x∗) = 0. Since
f (x) > 0f o ra n yx ∈ [0,x ∗)a n df (x) < 0 for any x ∈ (x∗,µ+ r), it follows that x∗ is
unique. Of course, the optimal innovation intensity of the ﬁrm is simply λ = x∗.
To see how λ depends on parameters, plot f(x)a n dc (x)f o rx ∈ [0,µ]. The unique
intersection of these curves determines λ.A ni n c r e a s ei n¯ π shifts up f(x), leading to an
increase in λ. Similarly, an increase in r or µ shifts f(x) down, leading to a decrease in
λ. A shift up in c  also leads to an increase in c and a resulting shift down in f(x). The
shift up in c  and shift down in f lead to an unambiguous decline in λ.
Our assumptions on the cost function [¯ π − c(µ)]/r ≤ c (x) < ¯ π/(r + µ)f o rx ∈ [0,µ]
appear arbitrary. If we dropped the upper bound on c , then we get the solution λ =0i n
t h ec a s eo fc (0) ≥ ¯ π
r+µ. The lower bound on c  is more critical, as we want to analyze a
ﬁrm’s dynamics under the restriction λ ≤ µ, a restriction which will arise naturally when
we consider the industry equilibrium.
Appendix C: Solving the System of Diﬀerence-Diﬀerential Equa-
tions
Let Nt be the random variable giving the size of a ﬁrm at date t. The probability of the
ﬁrm having n products (n ≥ 1) at time t +∆ t satisﬁes the relationship
P [Nt+∆t = n]=( n − 1)λ∆tP[Nt = n − 1]
+(n +1 )µ∆tP[Nt = n +1 ]
+[1− n(λ + µ)∆t] P [Nt = n]+O(∆t),
33where lim∆t→0O(∆t)/∆t =0 . Following standard techniques described, e.g., in Karlin
and Taylor (1975, ch. 4) and in Goel and Richter-Dyn (1974, section 2), we ﬁnd that




P [Nt+∆t = n] − P [Nt = n]
∆t
=( n − 1)λP[Nt = n − 1] + (n +1 )µP[Nt = n +1 ]
−n(λ + µ) P [Nt = n].
Letting pn(t)=P[Nt = n], we obtain a more compact expression
˙ pn(t)=( n − 1)λpn−1(t)+( n +1 ) µpn+1(t) − n(λ + µ)pn(t),n ≥ 1. (20)
The probability of exit, i.e., hitting the absorbing state n =0 , is described by
˙ p0(t)=µp1(t). (21)
The set of coupled diﬀerence-diﬀerential equations (20) and (21) can be solved with































The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side can be restated by (21), while the second term can
be restated by multiplying (20) by zn and summing over n from 1 to ∞, which, after
21The solution procedure is described in detail in Kendall (1948) and in Goel and Richter-Dyn (1974)
(in particular chapter 2 and appendix B).
34some rearrangements of terms, gives
∂H(z,t)
∂t





























This is a partial diﬀerential equation of the Lagrangian type, and its solution is discussed
in Goel and Richter-Dyn (1974).
In order to solve for H(z,t), we require some initial condition. To analyze a ﬁrm that








With the initial condition (27), the solution to (26) can be written
H(z,t;n0)=

µ(z − 1)e−(µ−λ)t − (λz − µ)
λ(z − 1)e−(µ−λ)t − (λz − µ)
n0
. (28)
A Taylor series expansion of H(z,t;n0) around z = 0 yields the probability distribution

















35so that for any t and n0, we get a proper distribution on the nonnegative integers. Fur-











I nt h ec a s ew h e nµ → λ (the case with no entry) both the numerator and the de-
nominator inside the square brackets on the right-hand side of (28) approach zero. Using







µ(z − 1)e−(µ−λ)t − (λz − µ)





µt(z − 1) − 1
µt(z − 1) − z
n0
. (32)
Appendix D: The Size Distribution
Derivation of (17): From (15) and (16), we have that
˙ M = η − µM1. (33)
In steady state all the time-derivatives in (15), (16), and (33) are zero. Starting with (33),









Applying (15) and setting ˙ Mn(t) = 0, it is straightforward to prove by induction that the




nµn ,n ≥ 1. (36)





pn(t;m)Mm(0) = 0, ∀n ≥ 1.
Since pn(t;m) is a sequence of terms bounded between 0 and 1 and
	∞
m=1 Mm(0) is ﬁnite

















The third equality reﬂects that limt→∞ pn(t;m)=0 , ∀(m,n) ≥ 1, since all ﬁrms eventually
exit as shown in section 4.3. Q.E.D.
Appendix E: The Social Planner’s Problem
We consider the social planner’s problem as limited to choosing the allocation of workers
between production and the two research activities, start-ups and incumbent research.
The planner is constrained to accept the market allocation of production workers across
goods. That is, the planner can subsidize production or research work as such, but cannot
target subsidies to the production of individual goods.














0 x(j)dj = E [q−1]/w; i.e.,
w = E [q−1]/LX. Furthermore,











− E [lnq]+l nLX.
37The stock of innovations for any good is given by Jτ =
 τ
0 µ(s)ds so that ˙ J = µ = λ + η.
From the labor constraint
η = h(L − LX − LR).
Hence, the current value Hamiltonian is






− E [lnq]+l nLX + ϑ{λ + h[L − LX − lR(λ)]},
where we have used that LR = lR(λ). The ﬁrst-order conditions, where we denote the
















Notice that the last relationship is the same as for the market solution, which implies that
incumbent research is the same for the planner and the market economy. The co-state
variable satisﬁes
˙ ϑ = ρϑ −
∂H
∂J
= ρϑ − E [lnq].


















As derived in section 7.1, the market will choose LX = E [q−1][L + ρ/h]. Hence,
µ
∗ − µ = η















In the special case of only a single type of ﬁrm π =¯ π, and hence no variation in q,w eg e t
µ











38which is exactly the same expression as Grossman and Helpman (1991) derive. The
market economy grows too slowly when the inventive step q is in an intermediate range.
On the other hand, if q is either very small or very large, then the market economy grows
too quickly.
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